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Inspiration for my Essay comes from an influential article written by
Michael Reisman four decades ago titled The Enforcement of International
Judgments.' His article presented a "model" for improving enforcement of
international judicial decisions in cases between states. The tribunal that
Reisman referred to most often was the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Although there have been some developments in the ICJ since 1969 that
benefited from his insights, the tribunal in which Reisman's ideas have
flowered the most is the dispute system of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The purpose of my Essay is to point out how the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) achieved much of what Reisman envisioned
with respect to systematic enforcement of multilateral tribunal decisions.
My Essay begins by summarizing the institutional improvements
Reisman recommended. Then this Essay demonstrates how the WTO's DSU
achieves many of those objectives in law and practice. Finally, this Essay
takes note of continued confirmation of Reisman's thesis in the Appellate
Body decision in the new United States-Continued Suspension case, a
dispute about how to judge compliance and when to lift trade sanctions.3
In his article, Reisman brought much-needed scholarly attention to
international enforcement. Noting the approach taken in the ICJ that "simply
presumes compliance, ' 4 Reisman proposed that the international community
give explicit attention to developing better mechanisms to achieve
enforcement. He defined enforcement as "the transformation, by community
means, of authoritative pronouncement into controlling reality." 5 Two
strategies for enforcement exist: (1) direct enforcement on the delinquent state
(e.g., physical transfer of assets) and (2) indirect enforcement, which consists
of "sanctions on the miscreant in order to persuade him to comply with
community norms. ' 6 Reisman put forward a hypothesis that "the expectation
of the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms is a factor inducing
compliance.
7
To show how a compliance expectation among governments can be
fostered, Reisman laid out a "functional model of enforcement" with these
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1. W.M. Reisman, The Enforcement ofInternational Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 1(1969).
2. Id. at 8-14.
3. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) (adopted Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.-
Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report].
4. Reisman, supra note 1, at 2.
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four elements: the target state that loses the judgment, the enforcers, the power
8bases of the enforcers, and the strategies employed. The potential enforcers
include, among others, "functional agencies" and a state directed by an
authoritative organization. 9 Economic sanctions are one type of indirect
enforcement, and Reisman explained that "[c]arefully planned sanctions may
bring about compliance without the dysfunctional results of the total
embargo." 10 Reisman noted that while enforcement directives in the United
Nations Security Council can be blocked, directives from functional
organizations have a higher probability of success.
Another contribution to enforcement theory are the principles Reisman
put forward to secure compliance with international law and to generate
expectations of effectiveness. First, he noted that international commerce can
provide for a "scale of equivalence" so that "substitutes can be found in lieu of
the original object of the dispute."" Second, he proposed anticipatory
enforcement whereby judgment funds are prepaid into court. Third, he called
for enforcement strategies to be "launched promptly" and explained that
dispatch can "prevent domestic politicization of compliance decisions.'' 1
2
Fourth, he argued that an enforcement program "should draft as wide a
participation as possible."'
13
In addition to these conceptual contributions, Reisman's article offered
some specific policy recommendations for improving the ICJ Statute.
Notably, he sought to give the ICJ an explicit role in "post-judicial"
enforcement. 14 For example, he would empower the ICJ to "sPecify principles
to govern compliance" and to set a time limit for compliance. 5 Once that time
has expired or on the initiative of the winner, the "winning party could reapply
unilaterally for a declaration of non-compliance.' ' 16 Reisman anticipated that
the losing party might "claim compliance" when in fact it has not complied.'
7
If so, he suggested that "[a] finding by the Court of non-compliance would
tend to undermine the position of the loser, emphasize the finality of the
judgment and expedite coercive enforcement."' Reisman also called for
greater attention to the possibility of using the delinquent state's own
domestic courts to enforce the international judgment. This could be
effectuated by a protocol to the ICJ Statute plus "appropriate internal
implementing legislation by each contracting state."
' 19
Unfortunately, over the past forty years, the United Nations has not
moved forward on any of these recommendations for strengthening the ICJ's
8. Id. at 9. Reisman notes that his model may be applied to other international decisions
beyond the ICJ. Id. at 9 n.26.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 25, 27.
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role in enforcement. Political conditions, particularly in the United States,
have not been conducive to strengthening judicial enforcement either in the
ICJ or through the Security Council. Nevertheless, it should be said that the
contemporary ICJ is a much more vibrant court than it was in the late 1960s,
and is no longer guilty of the pathology diagnosed by Reisman of being "so
incapable of effective decision that it must retreat from the most critical
cases."' 20 Moreover, for ICJ final judgments, the record of compliance by
states has been strong in recent decades.
Although Reisman's The Enforcement of International Judgments
focused mainly on the ICJ, he examined economic agencies (e.g., the
International Monetary Fund) in an earlier article about international
enforcement published in 1965 in International Organization. That article
did not mention the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
predecessor to the WTO. But it postulated a normative proposition that was
relevant to the GATT and later to the WTO. Reisman's 1965 article stated:
"No international organization is an island; the maximum effectiveness of the
economic agencies is integral with an interdependent international
community. It is important that the economic organizations view themselves
as a part of that community and, when possible, accept the obligations which
membership imports. 22
Unlike the ICJ Statute, the WTO treaty system does not presume
governmental compliance with authoritative judgments. Instead, the system
presupposes that governments will sometimes fail to comply. Indeed, the DSU
takes note of the contingency that a WTO member government "fails to bring
the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into
compliance." 23 Because it is based on a realistic appreciation of how
governments behave, the DSU contains a sophisticated postadjudication
system of "Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and
Rulings." 24 In addition, the DSU provides for a menu of ways that a WTO
dispute can end (when a violation exists) besides withdrawal of the WTO-
illegal measure. That menu includes a mutually acceptable solution,
compensation to the complaining WTO member, and the "last resort" of
temporarily suspending the application of concessions or other obligations
vis-A-vis the noncomplying member.25 1 have used the acronym SCOO as the
name of this ultimate remedy of suspension of concessions or other
obligations.
In designing the DSU, the negotiators sought to construct a dispute
system that would avoid the dysfunctions of the GATT system such as
blocking the appointment of a panel, the adoption of its report, or the approval
20. Id. at 26.
21. William M. Reisman, The Role of Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of International
Judgments and Awards: A Functional Approach, 19 INT'L ORG. 929 (1965).
22. Id. at 942.
23. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22.2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
24. Id. art. 21.
25. Id. art. 3.7.
The Enforcement of WTO Judgments
of a SCOO. 26 Reisman notes that enforcement directives from the Security
Council could be blocked by one country, but such blocking is now
impossible in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which has an
automatic procedure for approving a SCOO following a failure to comply.
27
In line with Reisman's model providing for sanctions on the miscreant in
order to persuade it to comply with community norms, the DSU utilizes the
SCOO as indirect enforcement. Back in 2001, I put forward a thesis that the
WTO had transformed the remedy that was prescribed under the GATT (but
never used) into a true "sanction" that would be imposable upon a scofflaw
country. 28 The WTO jurisprudence since 2001 has solidified the evidence for
my thesis that the SCOO is recognized as a trade sanction aimed at inducing
compliance. 29 Indeed, it is interesting to compare Reisman's statement that the
expectations of the effectiveness of enforcement measures is a factor inducing
compliance to the Appellate Body's holding in U.S.-Continued Suspension;
having to remove the SCOO simply because an offending government
declares that it has complied "would undermine the important function of the
suspension of concessions in inducing compliance" and "would significantly
weaken the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system and its ability
to provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading system."
30
Several other points should be noted in which Reisman's model is
predictive of key features of the WTO machinery developed twenty-five years
later. First, Reisman said that effective enforcement requires a time limit for
compliance and that "[a] lag between judgment and enforcement tends to
diminish th[e] expectation" that the system works and "to increase resistance
to voluntary compliance." 3 1 The DSU provides for arbitration to set a
compliance timetable. Furthermore, the enforcement procedure is launched
promptly because the DSU gives the complaining government only thirty days
following the conclusion of the period of compliance to take advantage of the
32automatic SCOO approval. Second, Reisman recognized that after a
violation of law is found, the losing party might "claim compliance" and the
winning party could "reapply unilaterally for a declaration of non-
compliance" by the court. 33 The DSU works in this suggestion for compliance
review in Article 21.5 which states: "Where there is disagreement as to the
existence or consistency with a [WTO] covered agreement of measures taken
26. In my view, the negotiators for the DSU did not understand themselves to be constructing
an international trade court, and therefore they may not have reflected on how they were making
improvements to the ICJ model.
27. DSU, supra note 23, arts. 22.2, 22.6, 22.7.
28. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Panel Report, U.S.-Continued Suspension, paras. 7.234, 7.343 n.480,
WT/DS320IR (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.-Continued Suspension Panel Report] (terming as
"sanctions" the use of the SCOO); Arbitration Decision, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, para. 3.71, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007) (recourse
to Arbitration by the United States under DSU Article 22.6) ("[T]he very reason for the existence of
countermeasures under the DSU is to induce compliance with the covered agreement that has not taken
place within the period foreseen in the DSU.").
30. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 381.
31. Reisman, supra note 1, at 22.
32. DSU, supra note 23, art. 22.6.
33. Reisman, supra note I, at 24.
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to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be
decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel. 34 Third, Reisman suggested
that international commerce would enable the adjudicator to utilize a scale of
equivalence in fashioning a sanction and that a substitute sanction "should be
sought insofar as it reflects the subjective valuation of the litigants."35 The
DSU implements this suggestion by providing a principle that the level of
SCOO should be equivalent to the "nullification or impairment" and in
providing for the possibility of so-called cross-retaliation, where the
complaining country can choose to seek a SCOO through an unrelated WTO
agreement (e.g., requesting a SCOO on intellectual property even though the
underlying litigation was not about intellectual property). Fourth, Reisman
called on the ICJ to specify "general principles of compliance or any other
directive which the Court may deem appropriate. '" The DSU authorizes the
Appellate Body and panels to "suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations."
The concern that Reisman expressed in the 1965 International
Organization article about fragmentation in international economic law
proved prescient. 39 During the first four decades of the postwar trading
system, the GATT sometimes viewed itself as a self-contained system
separate from the rest of international law. That narrow-mindedness was put
to bed in the first decision handed down by the Appellate Body, which stated
that the DSU reflects a recognition that the GATT "is not to be read in clinical
isolation from public international law." 40 This holding contributed
enormously to assuring that the WTO is not "incapable of effective
decision"41 by widening the law to be applied-for example, by intensively
importing principles from international law.
42
Perhaps more so than the ICJ, the WTO dispute system has been
effective because there is an expectation that decisions will ultimately be
complied with. In Reisman's words, effective law "depends upon
predispositions among an effective majority of participants towards
34. DSU, supra note 23, art. 21.5.
35. Reisman, supra note 1, at 22.
36. DSU, supra note 23, arts. 22.3 to -.4.
37. Reisman, supra note 1, at 26.
38. DSU, supra note 23, art. 19.1.
39. See Reisman, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
40. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline 16, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). The presiding member of the Appellate Body division in
the Gasoline case was Florentino Feliciano. See W. Michael Reisman, A Judge's Judge: Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano's Philosophy of the Judicial Function, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN
DIGNITY 3, 8-9 (Steve Chamovitz, Debra P. Steger & Peter Van den Bossche eds., 2005) (discussing the
role of judicial choice and noting that "the judge may be obliged to consult more general community
values").
41. Reisman, supra note 1, at 26.
42. See Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 421 (2008).
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compliance with authority. ''43 A recent empirical study of compliance in the
WTO found a generally positive record of compliance.
44
A full appreciation of Reisman's article requires that one mention, if
only briefly, a few of his proposals that remain too visionary for incorporation
into the WTO system. As noted above, he calls for anticipatory judgment
funding, community participation of sanction senders, and the use of domestic
courts to enforce international judgments. Of those three, the idea of collective
enforcement of WTO judgments is the only one that has been discussed by
WTO negotiators.45
The recent Appellate Body decision provides new confirmation of
Reisman's model and his thesis that law requires an "expectation of
effectiveness" and that "[c]reating and sustaining that expectation is a basic
legal function.",46 The U.S.-Continued Suspension decision was a
constitutional decision wherein the Appellate Body filled in gaps in DSU law
that threatened to undermine WTO enforcement. The constitutional dimension
in Continued Suspension was who would decide whether to lift a WTO-
authorized SCOO against a defendant country when that country claimed that
it had finally taken measures to correct its earlier violation. Although the DSU
has rules for how to seek and approve a SCOO, there are no explicit rules for
how to get a SCOO removed. This lacuna in WTO law has been long
recognized, and there have been several proposals by governments for an
amendment to the DSU to create such procedures.47 Because they are tethered
to the failing Doha Round, these DSU reform negotiations have not generated
any legislative change.
The Continued Suspension case is complicated, and the Appellate Body
decision was over three hundred pages long. Given space limitation, I can
provide only a brief summary. In the original case, the United States brought a
complaint to the WTO about a European Community (EC) directive in 1996
banning the importation of meat produced with growth-promoting
hormones. 48 The panel found numerous violations. In 1998, the Appellate
Body, while narrowing the lower panel's decision, ruled that the import ban
violated the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)49 because the European measure
43. Reisman, supra note 1, at 26.
44. Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on Compliance with WTO Dispute
Settlement Decisions, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETrLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
771, 772 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008) (finding rates of 67% for
compliance, 24% for partial compliance, and 9% for unabashed noncompliance).
45. See, e.g., Sayera J. lqbal Qasim, Collective Action in the WTO: A "Developing"
Movement Toward Free Trade, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 153 (2008).
46. Reisman, supra note 1, at 26.
47. Negotiations on Improvements and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
Proposal by Japan, at 9, TN/DS/W/22 (Oct. 28, 2002); see also Suzanne Bermann, EC-Hormones and
the Case for an Express WTO Postretaliation Procedure, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 154 (2007) (arguing
that no DSU article is capable of resolving postretaliation complaints).
48. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, paras. 1, 5,
WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report].
49. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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was not based on a risk assessment. 50 After arbitration to determine the
appropriate level of SCOO, the DSU in 1999 authorized the U.S. government
to impose a SCOO against the EC of $116.8 million a year, and the U.S.
government immediately did so. 5 1 In 2003, the EC withdrew its 1996 directive
and replaced it with a new directive seeking to strengthen the justification for
its continuing ban.52 At the same time, the EC asserted to the DSB that the EC
had come into compliance and that the continuing suspension of concessions
by the United States was no longer justified. After the U.S. government
refused to acknowledge the claimed compliance or to lift the SCOO, the EC
brought a complaint against the United States and obtained a new panel in
2005. This panel issued an odd, split ruling. On the one hand, it found that the
EC had not established that it had removed the measure violating the SPS
Agreement. 53 On the other hand, the panel found that the United States was
violating DSU Articles 23.1 and 23.2(a) by making a determination that an EC
violation had occurred without recourse to DSU procedures. 54 In addition, the
panel suggested that an action by the EC to withdraw the measure would
supersede the DSU authorization for the SCOO obtained by the United
States.55 The EC appealed and the United States cross-appealed. In October
2008, the Appellate Body reversed the panel on numerous holdings. On the
SPS matter, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's holding and made no
finding as to whether the EC was now in compliance with the SPS
Agreement.56 On the DSU matter, the Appellate Body reversed the holding
against the United States.57 As of March 2009, settlement talks are ongoing.
Although the Appellate Body did not settle the Hormones dispute, it did
clarify some disputed DSU provisions. Given the limited progress in the
ongoing Doha Round negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the
DSU, the Appellate Body exercised the full extent of its authority to interpret
the DSU, and thus to improve its effectiveness. The Appellate Body's activist
stance leads me to recall Reisman's suggestion that the ICJ take a more active
role in the postadjudicative phase, and that such action was "permitted by
general judicial practice and not prohibited by the language of the Statute."58
A key legal development in the case is that the Appellate Body put the
kibosh on the EC's scheme to feign compliance with the SPS agreement and
then to demand that the United States remove the SCOO. The EC argued that
even though its longtime import ban remained intact, the United States had an
obligation to eliminate its SCOO merely because the EC had withdrawn the
1996 directive and replaced it with a new directive in 2003. 9 In response, the
Appellate Body ruled that a DSB-authorized SCOO "may continue until the
50. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 253.
51. Id. paras. 8-9.
52. Id. paras. 11-12.
53. U.S.-Continued Suspension Panel Report, supra note 29, para. 7.847.
54. Id. para. 7.251.
55. Id. para. 7.343.
56. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, paras. 619-20, 734-35.
57. Id. para. 408.
58. Reisman, supra note 1, at 24 (footnote omitted).
59. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 286.
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removal of the measure found by the DSB to be inconsistent results in
substantive compliance." 60 The term "substantive compliance" does not exist
in the text of the DSU. Rather, it was invented by the Appellate Body in this
case to distinguish true compliance with only "formal removal of the
inconsistent measure." 61 The Appellators further explained that "[r]equiring
termination of the suspension of concessions simply because a Member
declares that it has removed the inconsistent measure, without a multilateral
determination that substantive compliance has been achieved, would
undermine the important function of the suspension of concessions in
inducing compliance."
62
Another key Appellate Body holding is that both complaining and
defending parties may use the Article 21.5 procedure to determine whether a
new measure achieves compliance. 63 Indeed, the Appellate Body went even
further and held that both parties must invoke Article 21.5 in the case of a
disagreement about the reality of substantive compliance. 64 The EC had made
an end-run around the Article 21.5 process because it wanted to avoid the
judges on the original 1998 panel. The justification the EC put forward was
that the DSU did not allow it to invoke Article 21.5 to verify its own
compliance. 65 Its supposed inability to ask for an Article 21.5 panel was the
EC's excuse for invoking a new panel against the United States for continuing
the SCOO. The Appellate Body saw the end-run and recognized the threat to
the effectiveness of compliance review if a defendant could go around Article
21.5 by bringing a new cause of action against the SCOO. The Appellate
Body buttressed its holding that the Article 21.5 procedure was "the proper
course of action" by noting that a return to the original panel would bring
expertise and prompt resolution.
66
The last exercise of gap-filling power is the Appellate Body's holding
that once an Article 21.5 panel finds compliance and its report is adopted by
the DSB, such DSB action serves to repeal the previous action that authorized
the SCOO. In the words of the Appellate Body, the SCOO "lapses by
operation of law (ipsojure) .'67 This is one of the most remarkable holdings of
the Appellate Body during its thirteen-year history. Faced with a deficient
legal text, a flailing Doha negotiation, and a possible ruling by a future Article
21.5 panel that the EC has complied in Hormones, the Appellate Body
60. Id. para. 306.
61. Id. para. 308. The Appellate Body apparently liked its phrase and used it over 50 times.
The term is employed again in the recent DSU Article 21.5 decision in the EC-Bananas litigation.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, paras. 272-73, 322-23, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA (Nov. 26, 2008).
62. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 381.
63. Id. paras. 345, 348, 358, 368. This conclusion was anticipated in Jason E. Kearns & Steve
Chamovitz, Adjudicating Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
331, 341-43 (2002).
64. U.S.-Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, paras. 336, 340, 354-
55, 737.
65. Id. para. 349.
66. Id. paras. 344-45.
67. Id. para. 310; see also id. paras. 321, 367 (seeing an obligation to cease the SCOO); id.
para. 355 (saying that this situation renders the SCOO without legal basis); id. para. 384 (seeing a cause
of action if the SCOO is not immediately terminated).
2009]
566 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34: 558
clarified that WTO adjudicators will decide when governments are in
compliance with WTO rules and when a SCOO may be used to enforce a
WTO judgment.
In conclusion, Reisman's vision of a more effective world court has
been realized sooner in the arena of world trade than it has in the ICJ. No one
in 1969 would have predicted the DSU, and I am unaware of anyone today
predicting a much stronger ICJ by 2019. Yet some day that will eventuate, and
those who design it will be inspired by the model put forward by Reisman.
